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1981
Volume 35, Issue 2
  • ISSN: 1364-971X
  • E-ISSN: 1758-9150

Abstract

Claims from the media and academic research suggest that during the first Zapatero government (2004–08), the (President’s Economic Office) played an activist role, not only in the development of its legal functions but also in the decision-making process related to economic policy. Given that the OEP was headed by individuals who had no political experience at the time they were appointed, and moreover were assisted by technical experts of the same background, this article intends to examine the extent to which this kind of reform of the core executive – seen as a product of presidentialization – undermined the influence of the minister of Finance.

Resumen

Informaciones periodísticas e investigaciones académicas sugieren que, durante el primer Gobierno de Zapatero (2004–08), la (OEP) desempeñó un rol activista, no solo en el desarrollo de sus funciones legales, sino también en el proceso de toma de decisiones relativo a la política económica. Dado que la OEP fue encabezada por individuos sin experiencia política previa en el momento de su nombramiento, asesorados por técnicos con un bagaje similar, este artículo pretende examinar en qué medida dicha reforma del core executive – entendida como un producto de la presidencialización – socavó la influencia del ministro de Economía.

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2022-06-01
2024-09-18
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