‘A trick with rebounds’: Portugal, Zambia and the Rhodesian crisis (1967–1968)

This article analyses the Portuguese government’s political approach to Zambia between 1967 and 1968. During this time, South Africa was assuming its strategic preponderance in southern Africa while Zambia was the country most affected by the sanctions imposed on Southern Rhodesia. This provided the Portuguese government with an opportunity to persuade the Zambian prime minister Kenneth Kaunda to reject the presence of African liberation movements in Zambia in exchange for transport facilities during the boycott of Southern Rhodesia. However, Kaunda refused to collaborate in this way. Kaunda did not want Portuguese involvement with South Africa and Rhodesia in Angola and Mozambique and sought to offer his good offices in an attempt to end the war in those territories. The firmness of his decision was down to three main reasons: he did not want to be branded a collaborator with the ‘white redoubt’; he did not want Angola and Mozambique to become ‘new Rhodesias’; and he was absolutely sure of the unconditional support of the United Kingdom and the United States.