Journal of Gulf Studies - Current Issue

For several years, the Arab Gulf states have been undergoing a period of social opening and economic modernization, which are referred to as ‘reforms’. Notably, however, these do not affect the political institutions. One particularly important observation is that the leaderships in the Gulf region are using this new modernization strategy to turn away from traditional sources of legitimacy. Most importantly, Islam is being relegated to the background. This article is dedicated to exploring the question of whether the tendency to modernization on the part of the Arab Gulf states embodies a kind of rationalization of the sociopolitical realm that introduces a new form of legitimacy for the state. The article postulates that this predominant focus on aspects of modernization can have a contrary effect and can even damage the legitimacy of the state in the Gulf region, as long as it does not consider the social values and refrains from introducing political reforms. The analysis is based on three theoretical approaches: those of Karl Mannheim, Hermann Heller and Jürgen Habermas.

In times of growing decarbonization efforts among the Gulf states, they have started to engage more in green diplomacy and climate action by promoting energy diversification and investing in green developmentalism in the fields of climate mitigation and climate adaptation. In this regard, Gulf aid models are shifting from primarily financial support to technical assistance, with Gulf states increasingly aligning their development aid with global climate commitments. In this transition, Gulf leadership is framing environmental sustainability assistance as a fundamental component of their economic statecraft and diversification strategies, which carry significant geopolitical and geo-economic implications. This article argues that green aid functions as a strategic instrument for bolstering political and diplomatic influence on the global stage, while simultaneously aiding in external power projection efforts.

When Kuwait received its first oil export revenues in 1946, its regime expeditiously built a comprehensive welfare state. Not all authoritarian regimes are as generous, and a recent literature has emerged that seeks to explain when and why authoritarian regimes distribute their revenues. For the most part, the existing literature, on Kuwait and authoritarian regimes generally, focuses on conflicts between the regime and groups in society. I argue that conflicts within the regime itself, among the leading members of the ruling family, had a crucial role in driving the construction of the welfare state in Kuwait in the 1940s and 1950s. Control of the state was divided among members of the ruling family who competed for wealth, power and a chance to become the next ruler. This gave members of the ruling family an incentive to spend Kuwait’s new oil wealth through their state departments, fuelling the construction of a generous welfare state.

Review of: The Economy of Saudi Arabia in the 21st Century: Prospects and Realities, John Sfakianakis (ed.) (2024)

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 464 pp.,

ISBN 978-0-19886-387-8, h/bk, £108.00